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Lead Article
In their recent paper, Giebelhausen, Chun, Cronin, and Hult 
(2016, henceforth GCCH) provide evidence of a phenome-
non whereby consumers who participate in a voluntary green 
program experience a positive emotional response (i.e., a 
“warm glow”) that heightens service encounter satisfaction. 
A voluntary green program is described as any initiative that 
(a) has a stated goal of improving the natural environment 
and (b) utilizes the voluntary efforts of the sponsoring orga-
nization’s customers. Examples include towel reuse pro-
grams, housekeeping opt-out, recycling, trash sorting, and 
voluntary reductions in resource consumption such as turn-
ing down your air conditioning or taking shorter showers.
Warm glow, a construct originating from the economics 
literature (Andreoni, 1995), is described as a bivalent emo-
tional response. When people do a good deed, they experi-
ence a positive emotion akin to pride. When they do 
something bad (or fail to do something good), the emotional 
experience is characterized by feelings of guilt—a response 
described by Andreoni (1995, p. 1) as “cold-prickle of doing 
something bad” (Dahl, Honea, & Manchanda, 2005). In 
brief, what GCCH (2016) suggest is that, because satisfac-
tion is influenced by emotions (Homburg, Koschate, & 
Hoyer, 2006; Mittal & Frennea, 2010; Oliver, 2010), the 
positive emotions resulting from green program participa-
tion will have a positive impact on satisfaction. Conversely, 
however, negative emotions resulting from a refusal to par-
ticipate will have a negative impact on satisfaction.
This creates a problem for managers. On one hand, offer-
ing voluntary green programs will provide those who par-
ticipate with a satisfaction boost. On the other hand, it also 
deflates the satisfaction of nonparticipating guests. In their 
studies, GCCH (2016) search for a solution to this problem 
by examining the effect of participation incentives—con-
ceptualized as rewards given in exchange for participating. 
In particular, they examined “self-benefiting incentives,” 
“other-benefiting incentives,” and “mixed incentive bun-
dles.” As per Imas (2014), a self-benefiting incentive is con-
ceptualized as one that confers utility directly to the green 
program participant. Other-benefiting incentives, however, 
do not ostensibly benefit the program participant. Rather, 
they benefit some other entity. For example, a firm may 
offer to make a charitable donation each time someone par-
ticipates in a green program. A mixed incentive bundle is 
operationalized by providing consumers with a selection of 
self-benefiting and other-benefiting incentives (henceforth 
a self/other bundle). It is worth noting that these self/other 
bundles are actually quite common. For example, loyalty 
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programs often allow members to either earn points for 
themselves or donate points/miles to charity.
What GCCH (2016) find is that, consistent with the pre-
dictions of the self-signaling literature (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006), a self-benefiting incentive reduces warm glow and 
satisfaction for green program participants. Put another way, 
people do not feel as proud of themselves if they are getting 
paid to participate. However, for the nonparticipants, an 
incentive appears to provide psychological cover, reducing 
the guilt associated with their refusal to participate. An 
“other-benefiting” incentive (e.g., a donation earned for 
charity) has the opposite effect. For this incentive type, rela-
tive to a self-benefiting incentive, participating consumers 
feel even greater warm glow and satisfaction while nonpar-
ticipating consumers feel even less. Thus, marketers find 
themselves in a “catch-22” with no type of incentive that 
works for both participants and nonparticipants.
Interestingly, there appears to be an effective solution in 
the form of self/other incentive bundles. It is well estab-
lished that humans exhibit a confirmation bias whereby we 
are motivated to reach conclusions that benefit or protect 
our egos (Dunning, 2007; Kunda, 1990). In the context of 
self/other bundles, how this manifests is that participating 
consumers selectively focus on the other-benefiting fea-
tures, while nonparticipating consumers selectively focus 
on the self-benefiting features—allowing both groups to 
maximize their satisfaction.
In the present research, we replicate and extend the four 
studies reported in GCCH (2016) to examine the effect of 
participation incentives on guests’ service encounter satis-
faction. Study 1 (Appendix A) replicates the main effect of 
program participation in a hotel (vs. restaurant) field study. 
Study 2 (Appendix B) replicates the moderating effect of a 
self-benefiting incentive, but with a hotel scenario (vs. sec-
ondary hotel data) study to provide greater control. Study 3 
(Appendix C) replicates the finding whereby adjusting 
incentive type can moderate the effect. Importantly, how-
ever, Study 3 demonstrates this moderating effect using a 
reconceptualized incentive framework, which is the pri-
mary theoretical contribution of the present research. In 
particular, we look at three different types of self-benefiting 
incentives (virtue, vice, cash). Study 4 (Appendix D) repli-
cates the novel finding from GCCH (2016) whereby a 
mixed incentive bundle maximizes satisfaction for both 
green program participants and nonparticipants and also 
extends this finding to a hotel context. However, the present 
research demonstrates this effect using a mix of self-bene-
fiting virtue and self-benefiting vice incentives (henceforth 
a “virtue/vice bundle”). For hospitality managers, these 
results provide additional insights into how they might 
incentivize participation in voluntary green programs. For 
academics, the results introduce an alternative approach to 
conceptualizing incentives used to motivate prosocial con-
sumer behavior.
Theoretical Development
The present research expects to generate the positive main 
effect of green program participation on service encounter 
satisfaction, mediation by warm glow, and moderation by 
the incentive type as demonstrated by GCCH (2016). We 
formally state these predictions as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship 
between green program participation and service 
encounter satisfaction.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relationship between green pro-
gram participation and service encounter satisfaction 
is mediated by warm glow.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is an interaction of self-bene-
fiting incentives and participation in a voluntary 
green program. Individuals who participate are less 
satisfied with the service encounter when a self-bene-
fiting incentive is provided as compared with when 
an incentive is not provided. Individuals who decline 
to participate are more satisfied when a self-benefit-
ing incentive is provided compared to when an incen-
tive is not provided.
Reconceptualizing Incentive Types
The present research further seeks to expand on H3 by con-
sidering different types of incentives. As mentioned above, 
GCCH (2016) conceptualize incentives in terms of whether 
they benefit green program participants themselves (i.e., 
self-benefiting) or some third party such as a charity or the 
individual’s employer (i.e., other-benefiting). The argument 
put forth is that self-benefiting incentives interfere with the 
positive self-signal generated by volunteering to partici-
pate. In other words, when an incentive is offered, it is 
unclear whether participation is motivated by a desire to do 
a good deed or a desire to receive the incentive. Conversely, 
for nonparticipants, an incentive functions as psychological 
cover—allowing them to construe their refusal to partici-
pate as a rejection of the incentive. The present research 
further zeros in on the characteristics of a self-benefiting 
incentive (virtue, vice, and cash incentives) and how they 
might influence a self-signaling process.
Virtue versus vice incentives. Social norms are rules (either 
explicit or implicit) that a group uses to define desirable and 
undesirable behaviors. Norms come in different forms. In 
particular, researchers often draw a distinction between 
“injunctive” and “descriptive” norms. Descriptive norms 
describe the frequency of a behavior in a group (but not 
necessarily the valence of that behavior). Cialdini, Reno, 
and Kallgren (1990) put it this way: “In contrast to descrip-
tive norms which specify what is done, injunctive norms 
specify what ought to be done” (p. 1015). We conceptualize 
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a vice incentive as one that is tempting to consume, but 
whose consumption is inconsistent with injunctive social 
norms regarding how people ought to behave. Examples 
might include “guilty pleasures” such as unhealthy food or 
expensive luxuries. Conversely, we conceptualize a virtue 
incentive as one whose consumption is consistent with 
injunctive norms. Examples include healthy food or gym 
passes. We should note that “other-benefiting” incentives 
such as donations to charity would qualify as virtuous. 
Indeed, we suggest that other-benefiting incentives are sim-
ply a particular type of virtue incentive that directly benefits 
someone other than the green program participant. The 
present research is designed to demonstrate that other types 
of virtuous incentives will produce similar results.
In particular, consumers who participate when a virtue 
incentive is offered will have complied with two injunctive 
norms and should experience doubly positive self-signals, 
higher levels of warm glow, and greater satisfaction. 
Conversely, those who participate when a vice incentive is 
offered might consider that their behavior is motivated by the 
vice. This negative signal counteracts the positive signal gener-
ated by their participation. Put another way, there is a positive 
and negative signal that will, to some extent, cancel each other 
out. The exact opposite effect will be occurring among nonpar-
ticipants. When a consumer rejects an offer to participate in a 
program paired with a vice incentive, they may rationalize that 
their behavior was motivated by a desire to avoid the vice. 
Thus, the positive signal of rejecting the vice will help cancel 
out the negative signal generated by refusing to participate in a 
good cause. However, refusing to participate when a virtuous 
incentive is present will be doubly bad. In summary, we pro-
pose that, as the incentive becomes more virtuous, consumers 
who voluntarily participate in green programs are more satis-
fied with the service experience. Conversely, consumers who 
refuse to participate will be more satisfied as the incentive 
becomes more of a vice—even when both types of incentives 
provide utility to the person (i.e., are self-benefiting).
Cash incentives. Transactions involving cash payments are 
particularly effective at evoking market norms (Heyman & 
Ariely, 2004). However, market and social norms are gener-
ally seen as incompatible with one another. In fact, it is 
argued that, when cash is involved, they cannot operate 
simultaneously (Ariely, 2008; Clark & Mills, 1979). Thus, 
compared with small tokens of appreciation in the form of 
either a virtue or vice, small cash payments should result in 
the lowest feelings of warm glow among participants and, 
conversely, the highest levels of warm glow among nonpar-
ticipants. In sum, we expect the absence/presence of rewards 
and the virtue/vice/cash characteristics of rewards to affect 
service encounter satisfaction as follows:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): When an incentive is provided, 
individuals who choose to participate in a voluntary 
green program are most satisfied with the service 
encounter when the incentive represents a virtue, less 
satisfied when the incentive represents a vice, and 
least satisfied when the incentive is a cash payment.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): When an incentive is provided, 
individuals who choose not to participate in a volun-
tary green program are most satisfied with the service 
encounter when the incentive is a cash payment, less 
satisfied when the incentive represents a vice, and 
least satisfied when the incentive represents a virtue.
Reconceptualizing the “Mixed Bundle”
GCCH (2016) created a “mixed bundle” by combining self-
benefiting and other-benefiting incentives (what we refer to 
here as a self/other bundle). They found that green program 
participants were equally satisfied when incentivized with 
an other-benefiting or a self/other mix. Nonparticipants, 
however, were significantly more satisfied when incentiv-
ized with a self/other mix (compared with an other-benefit-
ing incentive alone). The explanation for this finding is 
anchored in the literature on “motivated reasoning” (e.g., 
Dunning, 2007; Kunda, 1990). The basic premise is that 
individuals selectively interpret the bundle in the manner 
that most benefits their egos. Correspondingly, this means 
that a virtue/vice bundle will be perceived as relatively vir-
tuous by those who participate in the green program because 
their egos benefit from focusing on the “virtue” aspect of 
the bundle. In other words, to the program participant, the 
virtue and virtue/vice incentives will look the same. 
Conversely, nonparticipants will be motivated to interpret a 
virtue/vice incentive bundle as a vice, enabling them to 
rationalize nonparticipation as simply avoiding the vice. As 
per this process, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): When an incentive is provided, 
individuals who choose to participate in a voluntary 
green program are equally satisfied with the service 
encounter regardless of whether the incentive repre-
sents a virtue or is a bundle consisting of virtue and 
vice incentives.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): When an incentive is provided, 
individuals who choose not to participate in a volun-
tary green program are less satisfied with the service 
encounter when the incentive represents a virtue com-
pared with when the incentive is a bundle containing 
both virtue and vice incentives.
Study 1: Demonstrating the Main 
Effect in a Hotel Field Study
To test H1 and H2, we conducted a small-scale field study at 
an independent mid-scale hotel located in a suburban area of 
the Northeastern United States. During the study, which 
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lasted 1 month, guests checking in for a stay of more than 
one night were asked whether they would like to reduce the 
environmental impact of their stay by opting out of house-
keeping services. All of these multinight guests then received 
a satisfaction survey in an envelope along with their key(s) 
and information packet. On the outside of the envelope was 
a hand-written note, thanking the guest for their help with 
the research. The top of the survey featured a university logo 
and text explaining that the survey was part of a university 
study related to the emotions experienced by hotel guests.
The survey measured service encounter satisfaction 
using two 9-point semantic differential items asking guests 
to rate the extent to which they were (a) very dissatisfied/
very satisfied and (b) very displeased/very pleased (α = 
.973). Warm glow was then measured with four 9-point 
semantic differential items asking participants the extent to 
which they felt (a) unethical/ethical, (b) in the right/in the 
wrong, (c) wicked/virtuous, and (d) ashamed/proud. The 
survey also asked participants to indicate how many people 
were staying in the room, whether it was their first stay at 
the property, and the reason for their visit. We should note 
that participants were free to fill out this survey at any point 
during their stay. Thus, the satisfaction measure would have 
reflected their level of satisfaction at that particular point.
Analysis
Of the 30 completed surveys, 15 were from individuals who 
had elected to participate in the housekeeping opt-out pro-
gram. One individual who reported that she or he was stay-
ing at the hotel in conjunction with an Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting was removed from the dataset as it 
was reasoned the warm glow that she or he experienced 
would be substantially affected by factors other than partici-
pation in the sustainability initiative. An initial ANOVA 
indicated a marginally significant effect of sustainability 
initiative participation, F(1, 27) = 2.527, p = .062). However, 
this analysis revealed an outlier that was 2.937 standard 
deviations away from the mean of their cell. This outlier the 
only person to report a level of satisfaction below neutral. 
To examine the effect of this dissatisfied individual on the 
results, we repeated the analysis with this individual 
excluded. This second ANOVA indicated a significant 
effect of program participation, Mno-participation = 7.367 
(SD = 1.493), Mparticipated = 8.538 (SD = 0.660); F(1, 26) = 
6.818, p = .008, indicating that the dissatisfied guest had 
weakened this main effect. The Cohen’s d for this effect was 
1.014, well above the d = .8 cutoff for a large effect (Cohen, 
1988). The achieved power given the sample size and effect 
size was .832, above the .8 cutoff suggested by Cohen 
(1992). In summary, the results provide evidence of a main 
effect of participation on service encounter satisfaction and 
a preliminary indication that this effect may not extend to 
dissatisfied consumers.
The mediating process was evaluated using Preacher and 
Hayes’s (2008) bootstrap method via Hayes’s (2013) 
PROCESS SPSS macro. The procedure identified a signifi-
cant path from participation to warm glow (t = 2.271, p = 
.017) as well as a significant path from warm glow to satis-
faction (t = 2.809, p = .005). After controlling for this pro-
cess, the initially significant relationship between 
participation and satisfaction (t = 2.248, p = .018) became 
insignificant (t = 1.074, p = .148), suggestive of indirect 
only mediation (aka “full” mediation). The 95% bias cor-
rected confidence interval generated by the 1,000 bootstrap 
iterations did not include zero [0.0316, 1.7322], indicating 
the indirect effect was statistically significant. Three control 
variables (number of nights, number of people in the room, 
and whether it was the first stay at the property) were also 
included as covariates, but none were statistically signifi-
cant (p = .527, .335, and .591, respectively).
Discussion
The Study 1 results supported our basic premise (H1) that 
consumers who chose to participate in a voluntary green pro-
gram were more satisfied compared with those who chose 
not to participate. As with GCCH (2016) and in support of 
H2, the effect of participation was fully mediated by warm 
glow. Despite the encouraging results, Study 1 involved a 
small sample size and a removal of an outlier, which might 
raise questions regarding the validity of the findings despite 
the large effect size (d = 1.014) and adequate statistical power 
(1 − β = .832). As such, Study 2 was designed to replicate (H1 
and H2) and extend these findings (H3).
Study 2: Interaction of Participation 
and Incentives
Study 2 utilized a 2 (participation: did not participate, par-
ticipated) × 2 (self-benefiting incentive: no, yes) quasi-
experimental design with an additional control condition 
where there was no opportunity to participate in a green 
program. All individuals except for those in the control con-
dition self-selected into the participation conditions. Two 
hundred ninety-two individuals, recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, completed the study. Participants were 
lead through a “storyboard” scenario procedure similar to 
recent work by (Chan, Kwortnik, & Wansink, 2017). 
Respondents were asked to imagine that they were spend-
ing a week at a hotel. They were then shown a picture of a 
hotel bathroom containing a towel, a bathmat, and a green 
tent card on the counter. In the “no opportunity” (control) 
condition, the card informed guests that the hotel had 
installed energy-efficient washers and dryers to save 100 
gallons of water per week per room. In no incentive condi-
tions, participants were told that their participation could 
save 100 gallons of water per week. In the incentive 
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conditions, the card informed guests that if they chose to 
participate in the towel reuse program, they will receive a 
coupon good for a free drink at the hotel’s “Green Dragon 
Lounge” located on the 18th floor. Participants were then 
asked to “click the button (white dot) on the bath tub if you 
would choose to place your towel in the bath tub, leave the 
bathmat on the floor, and get fresh replacements when 
housekeeping services your room” or to “click the button 
(white dot) on the shower curtain rod if you would choose 
to hang your towel and bathmat on the shower curtain rod 
(and reuse them both the following day).” To keep the con-
ditions as comparable as possible, in the no opportunity 
control condition, participants were simply asked to indi-
cate whether they would hang their towel up or place it in 
the tub. No environmental implications were mentioned 
with regard to this decision.
Analysis
Of the 292 individuals who completed the study in its 
entirety, two participants failed one of the data quality check 
items asking whether they answered as honestly and accu-
rately as possible, resulting in a final sample size of 290. 
Twenty-seven participants indicated they would not partici-
pate in the towel reuse program. In support of H3, a 2 (par-
ticipation: did not participate, participated) × 2 (incentive: 
no, yes) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction of par-
ticipation and incentives on satisfaction, F(1, 189) = 4.684, 
p = .032. As with Study 1, in the nonincentivized condi-
tions, there was a “large” effect of voluntary program par-
ticipation on satisfaction, Mdidnot = 6.139 (SD = 1.720), 
Mparticipated = 7.640 (SD = 1.184), d = 1.016. To test the spe-
cific effect of incentives on participation specified by H3, a 
planned contrast was conducted on the four groups. Contrast 
codes were again used to test a pattern whereby, in addition 
to a main effect of participation, an incentive reduced satis-
faction for participants but increased it for nonparticipants 
(2, 1, −2, −1). This test again provided support for the 
hypothesized pattern (t = 2.917, p = .009; Figure 1).
To better understand the composition of the participation 
effect, we compared satisfaction scores against the control 
condition where participation was not an option. Among 
individuals who were not offered an incentive, green pro-
gram participants reported significantly higher satisfaction 
compared to respondents in the control condition, Mparticipated_
noincentive = 7.640 (SD = 1.184), Mcontrol = 7.003 (SD = 1.450), 
p = .001, d = .481, whereas nonparticipants (Mdidnot_noincentive 
= 6.139, SD = 1.720) reported lower satisfaction than respon-
dents in the control condition (p = .020, d = .543). In other 
words, the effect of participation on service encounter satis-
faction results from the combination of an increase in satis-
faction among those who participate and a decrease among 
those who do not. Among respondents who were offered an 
incentive, green program participants still reported higher 
satisfaction (Mparticipated_incentive = 7.454, SD = 1.330) as com-
pared with the control condition (p = .015, d = .324). 
Importantly, however, there was no significant difference 
between the control condition and those who declined to 
participate in an incentivized green program, Mdidnot_incentive = 
7.156 (SD = 1.759), p = .345, d = .095. This result replicates 
the finding of GCCH (2016) that an incentive can effectively 
counteract the decrease in satisfaction among program non-
participants—an important managerial implication.
It could be argued that choosing to participate in a volun-
tary green program put people in a generic good mood (and 
vice versa) and that the warm glow and satisfaction measures 
simply picked up on changes in mood. Although we do not 
believe this to be the case, to evaluate this possibility, a mod-
erated mediation analysis incorporating both warm glow and 
mood (Allen & Janiszewski, 1989) was conducted via 
Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro. For mood, the 90% bias 
corrected confidence interval (a more conservative test for an 
anticipated null effect) included 0 in both the no incentive 
[−0.1282, 0.0941] and incentive [−0.0413, 0.1701] condi-
tions; indicating that mood was not a viable mediator at either 
level of the moderating variable. For warm glow, the same 
analysis generated a confidence interval including 0 when an 
incentive was provided [−0.2550, 1.0460]. As expected, 
however, in the absence of an incentive, warm glow was 
found to mediate the effect of participation on satisfaction 
[0.4757, 1.9489]. Furthermore, in support of our proposed 
mechanism, the index of moderated mediation (−.7492) for 
warm glow did not include 0 [−1.6532, −0.0397].
Figure 1:
Study 2 Results.
Note. The dashed line represents the “no opportunity” to participate 
control condition. CI = confidence interval.
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Discussion
The findings of Study 2 replicate the results of the GCCH 
(2016) Study 2 and, thus, provide additional confidence 
regarding the hypothesized moderating effect of self-bene-
fiting incentives. This is particularly important given that 
the GCCH Study 2 utilizes a secondary dataset. Study 2 also 
provides support for H2 regarding how this effect is medi-
ated by changes in warm glow—particularly when incen-
tives are not provided. In addition, we were able to rule out 
mood as a potential alternative mechanism. Another useful 
feature of Study 2 is the inclusion of a control condition 
where environmental programs are present, but participa-
tion is not an option. The results of pairwise comparisons 
with this control group suggest that the difference between 
green program participants and nonparticipants results from 
the combination of a positive effect among those who par-
ticipate and a negative effect among those who do not.
However, there do remain unanswered questions. One 
issue worthy of further examination is how altering the 
characteristics of the self-benefiting incentive might moder-
ate its effect (H4). In addition, self-selection is a potential 
concern, and it is worth considering whether the results 
would replicate if individuals were randomly assigned to 
participate or not participate in the green program. Last, so 
far we have only examined one consumption context 
(hotels). Thus, the generalizability of our findings would 
benefit from a replication in an alternative environment. 
These considerations motivated the design of Study 3.
Study 3: Teasing Apart Incentive 
Types in a Retail Context
For Study 3, participants recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to a 2 (partici-
pation: did not participate, participated) × 4 (incentive 
type: none, virtue, vice, cash) between-subjects design 
with a no opportunity control condition. For this simula-
tion, participants were asked to imagine they were running 
to the grocery store around lunch time. To set the stage for 
a virtue/vice manipulation, participants were also asked to 
imagine that they were planning on buying their lunch 
from the grocery store’s salad bar because they needed to 
eat healthy that day. Underneath this scenario was a pic-
ture of a large promotional sign promoting a voluntary 
green program involving reusable shopping bags. In the 
virtue incentive conditions, the sign stated that customers 
who use their own shopping bag will get a free organic 
apple, an incentive consistent with their goal of eating a 
healthy lunch. In the vice incentive conditions, the sign 
stated that customers who use their own bags receive a 
free chocolate earth day cupcake. In the cash conditions, 
the sign indicated that a customer would receive 25 cents 
off their bill if they used their own shopping bag. In the 
“no opportunity” control condition, the sign announced 
that the store had switched to 100% biodegradable bags. 
Next, respondents read that it occurred to them that there 
was a reusable shopping bag back in their car. In the “par-
ticipated” conditions, above a picture of a parking lot full 
of cars, participants read that “you look back at the park-
ing lot and decide that you will go ahead and get the reus-
able bag out of your car.” In the “did not participate” 
conditions, they read that they looked back at the parking 
lot and decided that they will go ahead and just use a store 
bag this time. Under the picture they were asked, 
“Briefly…what do you think was going through your head 
as you made this decision?” The following screens then 
collected the same measures collected in Study 2.
Analysis
Out of 394 participants who completed the study, eight partici-
pants indicated that they did not answer the questions as hon-
estly or accurately as possible and were removed. One 
duplicate response was also removed, resulting in a final sam-
ple size of 385. A 2 (participation: did not participate, partici-
pated) × 2 (incentive: no, yes) ANOVA indicated a significant 
interaction of participation and incentives, F(1, 339) = 5.508, 
p =.020, in determining service encounter satisfaction. 
Consistent with H1, among those not incentivized, there was a 
significant effect of participation on satisfaction, Mdidnot = 
6.561 (SD = 1.699), Mparticipated = 7.651 (SD = 1.036), d = .775, 
with an effect size similar to those observed in Studies 1 and 2.
To examine the influence of incentive type consistent 
with H4, a planned contrast was used to evaluate differ-
ences in satisfaction between the virtue, vice, and cash 
incentive conditions across the two participation condi-
tions. Contrast codes (3, 2, 1, −3, −2, −1) were used to spec-
ify the hypothesized pattern whereby virtue-incentivized 
participants would have the highest levels of satisfaction 
followed by vice and cash (and the opposite pattern for non-
participants). The results, not assuming equal variances, 
provide support for the proposed effects of incentive type 
(t = 2.284, p = .023; Figure 2).
To further examine the results with regard to the control 
condition (where program participation was not an option), a 
directional one-way ANOVA was used to compare all of the 
individual groups. Among green program participants, only 
those who were compensated with a virtue incentive were sig-
nificantly more satisfied than participants in the control condi-
tion (Mcontrol = 7.381, Mparticipated_virtueincentive = 7.873, p = .039). 
Among those who did not participate, only those for whom an 
incentive was not offered were less satisfied than the respon-
dents in the control condition (Mcontrol = 7.381, Mdidnot_noincentive 
= 6.561, p = .002). These results again suggest that the effect 
of participation on satisfaction results from the combination 
of an increase in satisfaction among those who participate and 
a decrease among those who do not.
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As with Study 2, a moderated mediation analysis was con-
ducted to evaluate the extent to which mood and/or warm glow 
might serve as a mediator. The bootstrap analysis for mood 
generated a confidence interval including 0 for both the no 
incentive [−0.0196, 0.1513] and incentive [−0.0250, 0.1093] 
conditions, indicating mood was not a viable mediator. In sup-
port of H2, the confidence interval for warm glow did not 
include zero for either the no incentive [0.6726, 1.5611] or 
incentive [0.1662, 0.5178] conditions. The index of moderated 
mediation for warm glow (−.7962) also did not include 0 
[−1.2026, −0.4290]. This again suggests a process character-
ized better by warm glow than by general mood states.
Discussion
Study 3, using random assignment, replicates the main effect 
of green program participation on service encounter satisfac-
tion observed in Studies 1 to 3. As with Study 2, pairwise 
comparisons with a “no opportunity” control condition sug-
gest that this effect resulted from a combined increase in satis-
faction among green program participants and a decrease 
among nonparticipants. Study 3 also provides additional evi-
dence that these effects are mediated by a self-signaling pro-
cess characterized by warm glow. The fact that these 
replications occur using a common retail setting and random 
assignment to conditions (avoiding self-selection issues) pro-
vides greater confidence in both the validity and generaliz-
ability of the findings. In addition, (and importantly for 
managers), the Study 3 planned contrast provided support for 
H4 regarding how incentive type further moderates the effect 
of incentives on satisfaction. Consistent with a process 
whereby different types of incentives can either amplify or 
attenuate self-signals, this planned contrast indicates that 
individuals who choose to participate in a voluntary green 
program are most satisfied with the service encounter when 
the incentive represents a virtue, less satisfied when the incen-
tive represents a vice, and least satisfied when the incentive 
was a cash payment. The opposite is true for nonparticipants, 
whose satisfaction is increased most by cash incentives, fol-
lowed by vice incentives. In Study 4, we examine the poten-
tial for a virtue/vice bundle to increase the satisfaction of 
nonparticipants without degrading the satisfaction of green 
program participants—the ideal situation for managers.
Study 4: Virtue/Vice Bundles
Study 4 was designed to provide additional evidence regard-
ing the key managerial outcome of GCCH (2016), that is, 
managers can increase the satisfaction of nonparticipants 
without harming the satisfaction of green program partici-
pants by offering a mixed bundle of self-benefiting and 
other-benefiting incentives (Figure 3). However, rather than 
the self/other mix utilized by GCCH (2016), this study used 
a bundle consisting of self-benefiting virtue and self-bene-
fiting vice options—a different mix that we argue above 
should generate the same outcome. To compare this virtue/
vice bundle against the most effective participation incen-
tive demonstrated in GCCH (2016), Study 4 incorporated a 
condition where the incentive was other-benefiting. As 
mentioned above, we consider an other-benefiting incentive 
to be a particular type of virtue incentive. Last, to further 
address potential self-selection effects, we incorporated 
both self-selection (i.e., where individuals could choose 
whether or not to participate) and random assignment (i.e., 
where individuals were not given a choice) conditions.
Figure 2:
Study 3 Results.
Note. CI = confidence interval.
Figure 3:
Study 4 Results.
Note. The dashed line represents the “no opportunity” to participate 
control condition. CI = confidence interval.
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As such, Study 4 is best described as a 2 (incentive: 
other-benefiting, self-benefiting virtue/vice bundle) × 2 
(participation: did not participate, participated) × 2 (assign-
ment method: random, self-selection) quasi-experimental 
design. A total of 804 individuals, recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, completed the study. Nine of these were 
dropped based on a data quality check asking them whether 
they responded accurately and honestly.
Respondents were asked to imagine they were spending 
three nights at a hotel as part of a work trip. They were then 
shown a picture of a hotel front desk featuring a large basket 
of snacks. The front desk staff explained that the basket was 
part of the hotel’s new sustainability program (housekeeping 
opt-out). In the virtue/vice incentive bundle condition, par-
ticipants were told that “For each day people participate they 
get to pick out two snacks they can munch on while watching 
TV in their room.” What made this incentive “virtue/vice” 
was that the basket was filled with half healthy items (e.g., 
Mott’s applesauce and Smartfood popcorn) and half 
unhealthy items (e.g., Snack Pack pudding and Dorritos). In 
the other-benefiting incentive condition, the staff explains 
that, “For each day people participate they get to pick out two 
snacks that will be donated to a program providing weekend 
lunches for low income school children.” The same snack 
selection was used for both conditions. Respondents in the 
self-selection conditions indicated their willingness to par-
ticipate while those in the random assignment condition were 
asked to imagine that they decided to participate (not partici-
pate) this time. Respondents then reported their satisfaction 
with the hotel and warm glow. To evaluate a second possible 
alternative mechanism, we also collected a measure of proso-
cial self-concept (Khan & Dhar, 2006). This scale asked par-
ticipants to indicate, on a 7-point scale, the extent to which 
they see themselves as helpful, sympathetic, warm, and com-
passionate (α = .739).
Analysis
To test our assertion that individuals will selectively interpret a 
virtue/vice incentive bundle to protect or enhance their self-con-
cept, we also included a three-item measure asking respondents 
to rate the extent to which the snack selection was unhealthy/
healthy, bad for you/good for you, and junk food/nutritious (α = 
.963). Presumably, individuals who refuse to participate in the 
program are motivated to interpret the selection as being rela-
tively unhealthy (i.e., a vice that should be avoided). Conversely, 
green program participants are motivated to selectively interpret 
the same snack selection as healthier to protect the positive self-
signal resulting from their participation. Consistent with this 
explanation, ANOVA indicated that green program participants 
rated the same snack selection as being significantly healthier 
than did nonparticipants in both the self-selection 
(Mparticipated = 3.662, Mdid_not_articipate = 2.661, p < .001) and 
random assignment conditions (Mparticipated = 3.564, 
Mdid_not_articipate = 2.843, p < .001).
Regarding service encounter satisfaction, ANOVA indi-
cated a significant main effect of participation, F(1, 776) = 
301.908, p < .001, qualified by an interaction of participa-
tion and incentive type, F(1, 776) = 6.334, p = .012. The 
three-way interaction with assignment method was insig-
nificant, F(1, 776) = 1.318, p = .251. In other words, the 
results were again the same regardless of whether an indi-
vidual self-selected or was randomly assigned to participate 
in the green program. Thus, for the remaining analyses, 
these conditions were collapsed.
To examine the effect of the incentive type consistent with 
H5, a planned contrast was used to evaluate differences in 
satisfaction between the other-benefiting and virtue/vice 
incentive bundle conditions across the two participation con-
ditions (participated vs. did not participate). Contrast codes 
were again used to specify the hypothesized pattern (2, 2, −3, 
−1). The result of this test, not assuming equal variances, was 
significant (t = 15.812, p < .001). In other words, we found 
support for the notion that virtue/vice incentive bundles have 
the ability to increase nonparticipant satisfaction without 
harming the satisfaction of participants.
For the mediation analysis, we sought to rule out prosocial 
identity (Khan & Dhar, 2006) as an alternative mediator. As 
was done to rule out mood in Studies 2 and 3, the moderated 
mediation analysis incorporated a measure of both warm 
glow and prosocial identity as potential mediators. For proso-
cial identity, the index of moderated mediation’s 90% confi-
dence interval (a more conservative test for an anticipated 
null effect) included 0 [−0.0085, 0.0867], suggesting proso-
cial identity was also not a viable mediator. Consistent with 
H2, for warm glow, the index of moderated mediation 
(−.3767) again did not include 0 [−0.6287, −0.2143]. 
Regarding the conditional effects, the confidence did not 
include 0 for either the virtuous [0.5011, 0.9725] or virtue/
vice incentive bundle [0.1971, 0.4975] conditions.
Discussion
The Study 4 analysis again demonstrated a main effect of 
participating in a green program qualified by an interaction of 
incentives, consistent with a self-signaling account. The pat-
tern of the results was consistent with H5, whereby virtue/
vice incentive bundles not only increased satisfaction for pro-
gram nonparticipants but also left the heightened satisfaction 
of green program participants unharmed—a key managerial 
implication. An added benefit of Study 4 is that we find this 
interaction does not depend on whether individuals self-
selected or were randomly assigned to the participation con-
ditions. This finding further reduces concerns regarding 
potential self-selection effects.
General Discussion
Replicating the four studies presented by GCCH (2016), we 
again demonstrate how consumers who downgrade their 
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service level by participating in a voluntary green program 
end up more satisfied with the service encounter. The fact that 
we provide additional confidence in this causal relationship is 
important, as this effect is contrary to the conventional wis-
dom of many hospitality managers (Hospitalitynet.org, 2012). 
In addition, the results of all four studies provide additional 
confidence that this effect is driven by a self-signaling process 
involving warm glow rather than mood or prosocial identity. 
One type of process evidence is the mediation analyses pre-
sented in all four studies. However, equally compelling evi-
dence is provided by the interaction of participation and 
incentives observed in Studies 2, 3, and 4. In line with the 
notion that incentives can interfere (or augment) self-signals 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2006), we observe predictable patterns 
whereby the presence of self-benefiting incentives can 
increase warm glow and satisfaction among program nonpar-
ticipants, but decrease them among those who participate. As 
such, we provide evidence of a process that can be generalized 
to a number of different contexts. Most importantly for the 
present research, we observe that changing the type of self-
benefiting incentives (i.e., vice, virtue, cash, and virtue/vice) 
further moderates this effect in a way that is consistent with a 
self-signaling mechanism. This provides not only greater con-
fidence in this moderating effect but also a more nuanced 
understanding of its generalizability.
The implications for managers are straightforward. For one, 
they should seek out opportunities to develop or expand volun-
tary green programs. Arguably, to increase satisfaction, they 
should persist with voluntary green programs even when there 
is little environmental or operational benefit. Furthermore, the 
present research reinforces the notion that managers should 
incentivize their voluntary green programs to maximize ser-
vice encounter satisfaction. In particular, it suggests the best 
course of action is to incentivize participation with an incentive 
bundle containing both virtue and vice elements. As was seen 
in Study 4, these virtue/vice bundles can be selectively viewed 
as a virtue by program participants and as a vice by nonpartici-
pants—providing the best of both worlds. This result mirrors 
the finding of GCCH (2016) involving mixed bundles of self-
benefiting and other-benefiting incentives. However, the real-
ization that virtuous self-benefits can be substituted for 
other-benefits is an important one for managers—given the 
greater variety and availability of virtuous self-benefits.
The present research makes a number of theoretical contri-
butions as well. For one, it expands our understanding of how 
prosocial consumer behavior can impact outcomes related to 
consumer satisfaction. Second, we also make a theoretical con-
tribution to the self-signaling literature. As mentioned above, 
there are few instances in the literature where a self-signaling 
phenomenon is subjected to a direct test of mediation. The 
present research suggests a self-signaling process that can be 
reliably captured with a measure of warm glow. In addition, we 
provide new insights regarding the effect of incentives on pro-
social consumer behavior—a topic that has not received due 
attention in the academic literature.
However, there are also a number of ways the present 
research might be extended. For example, future research 
might explore other incentive characteristics. Another par-
ticularly interesting variable to examine would be the cost/
sacrifice required for participation. One might expect an 
inverted-U shaped response whereby increasing the sacri-
fice/cost initially increases satisfaction for green program 
participants (via warm glow), but after a certain point starts 
to reduce satisfaction (via negative affect). The present 
research could also be extended by manipulating the extent 
to which the context evokes status goals (Griskevicius, 
Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010). For instance, the response 
to participation in a towel reuse program might be different 
at a luxury boutique hotel. Unraveling how consumers 
respond to sustainability initiatives is a complex task and 
many questions remain unanswered. However, it is our 
hope that the present research will help to advance this 
growing body of research.
Appendix A
Measures
Satisfaction (Crosby, Evans, & Cowles, 1990). Field Studies—
Regarding your overall experience at this (e.g., hotel) 
today:
Hypothetical Scenarios—Regarding your overall experi-
ence with this (e.g., hotel):
I am very dissatisfied/I am very satisfied
I am very displeased/I am very pleased
This has been a very unfavorable experience/This has been 
was a very favorable experience
Satisfaction (J.D. Power and Associates, 2014). Taking into 
consideration all aspects of your guest experience, includ-
ing the check-in/out, guest room, food and beverage ser-
vices, facility and cost, how would you rate your . . . 
OVERALL Hotel Experience” (10-point scale anchored 
“unacceptable” and “outstanding”).
Unacceptable/Outstanding
Warm glow (Giebelhausen, Chun, Cronin, & Hult, 2016). Please 
indicate the extent to which you felt this way during (e.g., 
your time at this hotel):
Ashamed/Proud
Irresponsible/Responsible
Wicked/Virtuous
Unethical/Ethical
Immoral/Moral
Selfish/Altruistic
In the wrong/In the right
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Appendix B
Study 2: Stimuli
Participation conditions
Incentive conditions
Appendix C
Study 3: Sample Stimuli
Participate/virtue incentive
Next page
No opportunity (control condition)
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Do not participate/vice incentive
Next page
Cash incentive
No opportunity (control condition)
Appendix D
Study 4: Sample Stimuli
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